"We Wanted Workers, But We Got People Instead"

Our Submission to the Home Affairs Committee

On the 27th of October, we submitted to the Home Affairs Committee’s consultation: Work-Based Immigration.

This allowed us to reflect on how the real problem is weak domestic training, not migration, and how migrant workers are left to pay the price of the gap they were brought in to fill. Sponsorship tied to a single employer and work bans that keep qualified people out of employment expose workers to dependency, exploitation, and destitution, a risk compounded by the No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) condition. Yet migrant workers make up substantial portions of our workforce, and certain sectors would struggle to function without them. Fair treatment is therefore not a trade-off against the skills agenda but its precondition, and the measures we propose, from portable sponsorship to a longer curtailment period and liberalising the right to work for those seeking asylum, are designed to help deliver it.

The ethos of our response stands in contrast to the circumstances Max Frisch’s famous quote reflects: “We wanted workers, but we got people instead”.

Work through the toggle below for a summary of the points made in our submission.

Immigration policy isn’t a neutral filter separate from domestic training, but migrants aren’t the cause of weak training systems. The relationship runs the other way: a training failure creates demand for an immigration “fix”, which can temporarily displace or mute the pressure to repair the underlying system. When employers and governments underinvest in training, recruiting from abroad becomes the convenient option. The architects of this backsliding are austerity and the profit motive.

The fault lies with employers who choose to recruit rather than train every time, refuse to redesign jobs or raise pay, and with policymakers who let them. Migrant workers, who bring real skills and fill real shortages, then inherit the conditions that weak enforcement of pay and labour standards, and the visa sponsorship model, allow. These conditions reflect a failure of effective regulation. The remedy is not fewer migrants but stronger training, better jobs, and rights that protect migrant and domestic workers alike.

The Home Office’s existing levers do little to break this cycle. The Immigration Skills Charge is billed as a way to encourage training, yet its success is unclear, and many see it as a hiring fee rather than a vehicle for investment in the domestic workforce. Meanwhile, almost all people seeking asylum are banned from working, and the two-year graduate route has been reduced. We risk wasting the skills of people already in the UK while continuing to recruit from abroad to fill gaps that, in many cases, those already here could fill.

Skill is not an objective property of an occupation. It is socially constructed, politicised and often gendered, and the public has consistently shown that they do not believe migration regimes should be ordered through this “classification”. The concept of a shortage is just as hard to pin down. If a shortage reflects low pay and poor jobs that few people want to apply for, filling it through immigration entrenches the problem rather than solving it. Neither concept is a sound foundation for policy.

The deeper flaw is treating people purely as units of labour. Under employer-tied sponsorship, a worker’s right to remain depends on a single employer, a short window to find another and no safety net if they cannot. That dependency invites exploitation and silences those who experience it. The earned settlement proposals compound this by prolonging exposure to NRPF, which risks driving away the very workers the system claims to want. Better skills policy can reduce reliance on international recruitment, but slowly, and a mixed workforce, ethically recruited, is a better aim than pure self-sufficiency.

People seeking asylum are currently permitted to work only where a claim has been outstanding for over a year, and then only in Appendix Skilled Occupations. This is doubly counterproductive. Those roles require UK-recognised qualifications and substantial experience, foreign-earned qualifications are often disregarded in hiring, and further training is prohibitively expensive for people who receive less than £10 a week in asylum support. The result is documented deskilling: refugee doctors and teachers are prevented from re-entering their professions, and highly qualified people see careers interrupted to the point that they cannot be rebuilt.

The fiscal case for reform is well evidenced. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research finds that lifting the ban after six months could save the Government £4.4 billion a year, increase tax revenue by £880 million and add £1 billion to GDP, while the Commission on the Integration of Refugees estimates that it would generate £1.2 billion for the economy within five years. The cost of the ban is also borne by the people it affects. The Migration Advisory Committee has noted that preventing groups such as asylum seekers from obtaining safe and legal sources of income “may push people into exploitative situations”, a finding echoed by the British Red Cross and UNHCR, and Women for Refugee Women has documented the current restrictions driving women into sex work. The ban on work creates the conditions for exploitation that many fled their homes to escape.

The Home Office could act without primary legislation, removing the occupation restriction and reducing the twelve-month wait to six months, as the Scottish Government has proposed. Where Holyrood has already set out a workable position, Westminster would do well to endorse it.

For these reasons, we’ve joined the Lift the Ban Coalition and taken an active role in their Scotland group. We believe the rationale for change and the reform proposed by the coalition will lead to a more mutualistic, productive system for everyone in the UK.

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